Most approaches to formal protocol verification rely on an operational model based on traces of atomic actions. Modulo CSP, CCS, state-exploration, Higher Order Logic or strand spaces frills, authentication or secrecy are analyzed by looking at the existence or the absence of traces with a suitable property.
Introduction
The formal verification of security protocols has been the subject of intense research in the last decade. Beliefs logics [8, 7, 27] , model checking and verification in process algebras using CSP [13, 22] or CCS [12] , theorem proving with induction [19, 5] or refinements [6] , state exploration methods [18, 16] or strand spaces [28, 26] , have been successfully applied to security protocols.
Notwithstanding the differences, there is a red thread running through CSP, CCS, state-exploration, higher order logic or strand spaces frills: a common operational model based on traces of atomic actions, so that authentication or secrecy can be analyzed by looking at the existence or the absence of traces with a suitable property.
For instance, Schneider [22] defines authentication as a pair of predicates (R and T ) so that whenever a trace of the protocol satisfies R (i.e. some receive event happened) then it must also satisfy T (i.e. some transmission event must have happened). Lowe proposed refined concepts of authentication where not only the existence but also the number of traces with a given property is important [14] . In Paulson's approach to authentication [19] , properties are exactly theorems over all traces. Using Bolignano's refinement approach [6] , we prove that an abstract model of the actual traces is indeed correct. Strand spaces by Fabrega et al. [28] or Meadows' model behind the NPA [16, 17] can also be brought under the same roof.
Expressing authentication as a property over traces is not necessarily a compulsory choice for some formalisms. However, reasoning about traces is most comfortable and it is widely believed that nothing is lost.
In [9, 10] we introduced an alternative operational approach based on parallel actions and an explicit representation of time. Our approach consists in specifying protocols within a logic programming language (AL SP ), and associating each run of the protocol, possibly described by many parallel actions, with a stable model of the protocol's specification. The existence of an attack can then be mapped into the existence of a model for the specifications of both the protocol and the attack.
Obviously, if we impose that only one action can be executed at a time, our model boils down again to the standard trace-based model, where time is just an index over a trace. This makes it possible to state soundness and completeness for bounded model checking over the classical model [9] .
However, things are not so simple when we allow for truly parallel actions.
Contribution of this paper
We show that, for many protocols such as authentication and key exchange protocols, modeling in AL SP and in trace based models is equivalent, as far as the representation of authentication and secrecy attacks are concerned.
We follow upon the analysis of fair exchange protocols by Asokan et al. [2, 3] started by Shmatikov and Mitchell [24] . We show that there are parallel attacks that may lead the trusted third party in the protocol into an inconsistent state. The trace based model approach does not allow for the representation of this kind of attacks (so that the protocol is "secure by default"), whereas our approach can represent them. This result shows that verification is sensitive to the model we use to represent protocols, and that we can classify protocols in two major classes: monotone and nonmonotone protocols. To execute an action in a monotone protocol an agent must only look at what happened, whereas an agent running a nonmonotone protocol must take care of the past and of what is currently happening in parallel with his intended action. An alternative way to look at the same problem is to say that in a monotone protocol we can always merge two "distinct" traces of the protocol and obtain another trace of the same protocol. With a nonmonotone protocol, we can no longer do so.
This makes also a difference for implementors: monotone protocols can have parallel implementations -just fork a new thread for each TCP/IP request and forget what's happening at your side -, for nonmonotone ones even variable synchronization might not be enough to avoid a disaster.
A Trace-based Model
Here we define an operational trace-based model of protocols. Mostly we borrow from Paulson [19, 5] and Schneider [22] . However, the features are shared with all cited verification papers.
We assume a sorted Herbrand domain of messages H m , where equality boils down to syntactic equality. The basic building blocks are agents A, B, etc. nonces N A , N B , etc. and cryptographic keys. We have at least two types of encryption keys: symmetric keys and asymmetric (public/private) keys. A key K is decorated by indices that denote the agents that know that key, e.g. K A is a key known (only) to agent A; K AB is a key shared by agents A and B etc. Public and private keys are sometimes prefixed by the letters "p" or "s". For instance pK A is A's public key and sK A is A's secret key.
We denote the concatenation of message m 1 and m 2 as m 1 ||m 2 . The hashing of a message m is h(m). The encryption of m with key k is denoted by {m} k and the type of encryption is determined by the type of the key.
We assume a distinguished domain of traces of actions H T built by the concatenation of the primitive actions, i.e. elements of the Herbrand domain H act representing the set of all possible says(A, B, M ), gets(B, M ), and notes(A, M ), where A and B are agents and M is a message. Many protocols require reasoning about time; we thus assume a function now(·) defined over a trace that identifies what time it is at any point of the trace. We also allow for natural numbers (time) and the primitive relation "less-than", which allows us to compare numbers with the current time. We assume that time is discrete: if T is a trace and # the concatenation operator on traces, we may have that Equality or monadic predicates may specify roles, such as servers or clients, and temporal relations less-than, greater-than may be used for timestamps.
Each inductive rule of a protocol can also be seen as a prefix of a strand, in the sense of Guttman et al. [28, 26] .
In Figure 1 we show a simple protocol and some inductive rules characterizing it. We use capital letters to indicate (implicitly) universally quantified variables. We also abuse notation and we write act ∈ T for "the action act occurs in the trace T " and m ∈ T for "the message m occurs in the trace T ".
The condition on the set M does not make possible (unless the protocol is broken) to mismatch the ordering of nonces so that an old reply is taken as an answer for a new challenge. Suppose that we have a trace like the following one (traces grow to the left):
Clearly we do not want that the reply gets(a, {b||n} pKa ), which uses n, is accepted as an acknowledgement of the second challenge, which uses n .
The rule cr 3 in Figure 1 will fire for the first two actions and add the acknowledgement says(a, b, n) to the trace. The action gets(a, {b||n} pKa ) will never be considered a response for the challenge says(a, b, {a||n } pK b ) because the nonces n and n do not match and thus rule cr 3 does not fire.
So far we have no intruder, but we can still define the notion of authentication properties. The definition is borrowed from Schneider [22] . Other, more refined properties can be defined following Lowe [14] . Definition 2.2 An authentication property over a set of primitive actions is a pair of finite sets of actions C (for Causes) and E (for Effects). A protocol P satisfies the authentication property C, E iff whenever all actions in E occur in a trace T ∈ P at least one action in C occurs in T .
In other words, C is the set of all (possibly alternative) causes for all the effects in E. In most cases the sets C and E are singletons. It is also possible to change the wording "at least one action" into "all actions" and viceversa, to consider disjunction of effects and conjunction of causes etc. With infinite domains this can be translated into family of pairs or, as done by Schneider, into arbitrary predicates over traces.
Verifying security properties without an intruder has little sense: in the Dolev-Yao model, the intruder is able to read traffic not directed to him, and to send messages without respecting the protocol. Thus we need to define operators on traces which take a trace and return a set of messages (the messages grabbed by the intruder) and operators on messages which take a set of messages and return the set of messages (the messages inferred by the intruder out of the knowledge of the input set of messages).
For instance, Bella uses init(A) as the set of messages initially known to agent A and defines the inductive operator knows as in Figure 2 : A similar definition, modulo notational changes, is introduced in the CSP modelling by Schneider and Lowe, where the intruder process is labelled by a set S, the set of known messages, which grows as soon as the intruder receives (i.e. synchronizes, in process algebra's terminology) a message.
For operators over messages, Schneider [22] and Lowe [14] use the inductively defined operator S m, where S is a set of messages and m is a message. Paulson [19] chose to split into two different operators, one for analyzing and one for composing message (resp. called analz, and synth). The "knowledge of the intruder" is then defined by the combination of the predicates synth(analz(knows(spy, T ))). This defines the set of messages that the spy can compose after decrypting all messages she has intercepted in the traffic. Now, we can upgrade the definition of protocols given in Definition 2.1 by allowing two additional inductive rules :
{M } ∪ knows(C, T ) if bad(A)
and C = spy knows(C, T ) otherwise 
A Time-based Model
We consider the same Herbrand domains of agents, nonces, keys, messages etc. as for traces, but model the "state-of-the-world" differently. We just sketch the key ideas here, and refer to Aiello and Massacci [9, 10] for further details. First, we assume a number of predicates over the same domains, called fluents 4 , which denote properties of the world and whose value changes over time, i.e. the predicates have an extra parameter (a natural number) denoting the time t when they hold. As an example: got(alice, m, t 1 ), and ¬got(alice, n, t 2 ) indicate that the agent alice got a message m at time t 1 , whereas she didn't get it at time t 2 .
Action predicates are denoted by predicate symbols with an extra time parameter, in one-to-one correspondence with the actions of the trace-based model. To distinguish the two sorts, we use the underlined says(A, B, M ) to denote the action occurring within a trace, and says(A, B, M, T ) to denote the corresponding action predicate. The time argument of the action predicates indicate the time at which the action is performed: says(bob, alice, m, t 1 ) indicates that the agent bob sends message m to agent alice at time t 1 . It is assumed that actions are instantaneous, i.e. their execution initiates at time t and terminates at time t + 1.
Then, we consider a situation as a set of predicates having the same time instant as parameter, and denoting the true properties of the world at the corresponding time. By close world assumption, we read as false all predicates not occurring in the set. The action predicates true in a situation mean that the corresponding actions have been all started in parallel at time t. In this way we can model communication concurrency.
A run is a finite sequence of situations indexed by the time instants 0, 1, 2, . . . . A protocol run is a run that satisfies some additional constraints concerning the particular protocol specification, and some general properties concerning causes and effects.
"Causal laws" specify how the truth value of action predicates affect the values of the fluents, in the form of the so called successor state axioms. For example, the effect of an agent getting a message is the logical constraint
The preconditions for sending a response after having received the appropriate challenge can be described with the following constraint:
The "laws of inertia" specify which fluents are unaffected by particular actions, so their truth values persist through the action execution. As an example, intercepting a message does not change its content, the status of other messages already sent by the agents participating in the protocol, the encryption keys used for them, and so on. For instance, sent messages remain sent:
Freshness of nonces is enforced by additional rules: we introduce the predicate used to specify that an object has occurred in a protocol action, hence freshness amounts to not used. Additional care must be taken when we allow for parallel actions. Intuitively, fresh(N, T ) is true in a stable model if N does not occur in any says(A, B, M, T ) in the stable model for T < T and is not used as fresh by two distinct agents (or by the same agent in two distinct messages) in parallel at time T . See [9, 10] for details. This treatment is close to the "uniquely originates here" of strand models [28, 26] . All laws can be recast as constraints on the possible sets of predicates that are admissible for consecutive times t and t+1. These constraints are specified using the logic language AL SP . So all stable models of the specification of the protocol, i.e. of the logical formulae in AL SP describing the protocols plus the effect and inertial axioms, describe a possible protocol run.
In a nutshell, in a trace based model the "state-of-the-world" is a trace, i.e. a sequence of actions. The inductive definition of a protocol just specifies which worlds are possible. Here, the "world" is a time indexed sequence of situations, where each situation is a set of actions which happen in parallel at the specified time instant. The AL SP specifications indicate which worlds are possible, i.e. which protocol runs, with possibly parallel actions, correspond to stable models of the specification.
So far we have not imposed a limitation on the finiteness of the Herbrand domain. To keep decidability we impose finitenes: that is we only deal with a finite number of agents and other atomic types (e.g. keys); see [10] for details.
Equivalence for Monotone Protocols
So far we have only spoken about protocols. To be, precise we should call protocols defined according to Definition 2.1, monotone protocols. In this section we show how we can recast this trace-based description of (monotone) protocols into equivalent logical constraints in AL SP .
To this end, we assume some familiarity with logic programming notation 5 , as for instance introduced in [1] , and refer to [9] for the definition of the semantics of AL SP rules. The definition of fresh(M, T ) can be found in [9, 10] . Then we can prove the following lemma: The proof is by induction on the length of the trace (see [10] ).
To prove the opposite direction we must weaken the hypothesis that the granularity of time is 1. Thus, we assume that time is discrete but its granularity can be as small as needed, i.e. now(says(a, b, m) #T ) = now(T ) + where is a small positive quantity. Otherwise, there will be obvious cases where the parallel execution of the protocol cannot be serialized in a trace. For instance, suppose that we get a "ticket for services" (such as in Kerberos [23] ) with a lifetime of 10 seconds. If we are able to make 20 parallel requests of services per each second, we can have 200 requests before the ticket expires. Once we serialize everything -one action per second -we can only ask for 10 requests before the expiration time.
Lemma 4.3 Let P be a protocol over a finite ground domainD and let P be an adequate AL SP specification of P . For every stable model of P ∪D there is a trace T ∈ P such that for every action fluent says(a, b, m, t), respectively gets(a, m, t) or notes(a, m, t), true in the stable model of P one has (i) says(a, b, m), respectively gets(a, m) or notes(a, m), is in T ; (ii) if says(a , b , m , t ), respectively gets(a , m , t ) or notes(a , m , t ), is in the stable model of P for some t > t then the trace T can be decomposed as the concatenation T #says(a , b , m )#T #says(a, b, m)#T , respectively with gets(a , m ) or notes(a , m) etc. provided the now() function is discrete but not necessarily with a unit step.
In the proof we need the hypothesis that protocols are defined according to Definition 2.1. Consider the simple case of two actions done in parallel at time t. From the view point of either action, the other action was not done yet. After we serialize them, when the "second" action is added to the trace, the "first" action has been already done. With monotonic preconditions this is not a problem, as we have no precondition on what is not in a trace.
Then we can define the notion of adequate specifications in AL SP of the inductive predicates pSet( t) and pT race( t, ·) and specify an adequate representation for an authentication property: got(a, m, t), says(a,b,m)∈C not said(a, b, m, t 
Clearly the actions which lead to the attack are identified by the action predicates (says(A, B, M, T ), gets(B, M, T ), notes(A, M, T )
) that are true in the stable model. This is also true when the stable model is infinite, e.g. if we allow for an infinite number of agents and nonces or do not set a bound on the maximum length of possible runs.
Similar definitions and theorems can be given for secrecy properties.
(Optimistic) Fair-exchange protocols
Fair exchange protocols have been introduced by Asokan et al. [3] , and have also been formally verified for fairness by Shmatikov and Mitchell [24] . We take the description of the protocol from Asokan's PhD thesis [2, Sec.2.2]. The protocol is run by two agents, O and R, who want to sign a contract, occasionally calling a third agent, a trusted third party T T P , in case of disputes. Given the inherent asymmetry of electronic communication, O and R do not want to commit to something and then be blocked forever waiting for the other party to commit, just because the other party is lousy or the communication is unreliable. The word "optimistic" in the definition stems from the assumption that both O and R are usually committed to sign the contract or exchange the goods and thus the TTP will be called into play only when things drag for too long. It is assumed that the communication channel between T T P and any other party is resilient (i.e. all sent messages will be eventually received), that the T T P behaves correctly, or at least always send a syntactically valid reply (not necessarily the right one) to every request.
Once we abstract away from the cryptographic details, the protocol is constituted by three subprotocols [2, Sec.2.2]: one for the normal exchange, one for aborting, and one for resolving the protocol. In the sequel we denote by me i the i-th message of the exchange protocol, by mr j the j-th message of the resolve a protocol, and so on. Normal Exchange. O creates a random number N O and then sends R a signed message including the hash of N O , the text of the contract, the name of T T P and both O and R public verification keys that is
If R wants to continue, he generates another random number N R , concatenates the received message with the hash of N R , signs the whole lot, and sends it to O: me 2 = {me 1 ||h(N R )} sK R . O responds by sending N O , and R concludes the protocol by returning N R .
If the first reply from R is late for whatever reason, O may decide to abort. Then she sends T T P a signed message including her first message to R and the abort token: ma 1 = {abort||me 1 } sK O . The T T P checks whether the protocol has been already resolved -e.g. it has already received the missing reply me 2 from R -and then issues a replacement contract, i.e. it signs the pair comprising O first signed message and R first signed message: ma 2 = {me 1 ||me 2 } sK T T P . If the contract has not been resolved, it stores the information that me 1 aborted and returns the message ma 2 = {abort||ma 1 } sK T T P .
are late for whatever reason, either R or O may decide to contact T T P to resolve the contract. To this end, one sends T T P both messages me 1 and me 2 , i.e. mr 1 = me 1 ||me 2 . The T T P checks whether the protocol already aborted -e.g. it has already received the abort token from O -and then issues an abort message i.e. mr 2 = {abort||ma 1 } sK T T P . Otherwise, it checks that both parties have duly signed the text and then issues a replacement contract i.e. mr 2 = {me 1 ||me 2 } sK T T P .
Valid Contracts. A valid contract has either the form me 1 ||N A ||me 2 ||N B , the normal exchange went through, or the form {me 1 ||me 2 } sK T T P , the resolve protocol was called upon. Notice, as pointed out in [24] , that abort does not mean that the exchange has been canceled, but just a promise from T T P to respond the same way in the future. he tricky bit is modelling the condition "if the protocol has not yet been resolved" in our trace based model. A natural way is to use the action notes to model the boolean variable: rather than checking whether aborted is true we check whether notes(ttp, aborted) is in the trace, and similarly for resolved.
This protocol has been already verified by Shmatikov and Mitchell [24] and, though a number of attacks have been found (e.g. O can obtain a contract which is inconsistent with a contract obtained by R), no substantial weakness of the T T P -side of the protocol has been noted.
We now consider the following basic security property, which is implicitly assumed in the proof of verifiability of T T P by [2, 3] Indeed, in [2, 3] a stronger claim is made: the protocol may be unfair to O, that is O gets an abort token from T T P whereas R gets a replacement contract, only if T T P misbehaves.
The natural trace based description of the abort and resolve steps of the T T P actions is shown in Figure 3 where we denote P f e the fair exchange protocol. The preconditions of the inductive definition are shown above the rule and the consequence is added below the rule.
It is immediate to see that with this model no attack is possible. Since there is a total order on actions, and only one action at a time can be concatenated to a trace, as soon as notes(T T P, abort) is inserted into the trace, it is no longer possible to insert notes(T T P, resolve) into an extension of that trace. So, in
AbortResolved. if T ∈ P f e and gets(T T P, {abort||me
AbortNotResolved. if T ∈ P f e and gets(T T P, {abort||me 1 } sK O ) ∈ T and notes(T T P,
ResolveAborted. if T ∈ P f e and gets(T T P, me 1 ||me 2 ) ∈ T and notes(T T P,
ResolveNotAborted. if T ∈ P f e and gets(T T P, me 1 ||me 2 ) ∈ T and notes(T T P, every trace either notes(T T P, abort)may occur or notes(T T P, resolve) may occur, but not both.
The "natural" AL SP translation of the above Abort steps (the resolve part is dual), obtained by extending Definition 4.1 is shown in Figure 4 . Notice that we used a choice rule only for the "Notes" subaction and the normal rule for the "Says" subaction. This is due to the fact that the second step is compulsory: the T T P , following the protocol, must store the outcome of the abort action and then communicate the result to O. Now we can look for models satisfying the goal:
we find that a model exists, and this model can be transformed into an attack to the actual protocol from [2, Fig. 2.2] , even in presence of synchronization primitives on the individual variables abortand resolve.
To carry on the attack, we must deliver to the T T P a resolve and an abort message in parallel. This may be obtained in a variety of ways: the intruder can delay the abort message by O until R issues a resolve, R herself can send an abort and a resolve ticket at the same time, etc. At this point, since the standard "adequate" preconditions refer to the past, both the rule for abort and the rule for resolve fire, and we are done.
From a practical point of view, the fact that the values of the precondition are examined in parallel is reasonable: it corresponds to synchronizing on individual variables, which is coherent with current web and internet servers technology. Obviously it is possible to force the abort and resolve subprotocols to be transactions, by using a syncronizing primitive at the beginning and end of the entire subprotocol. However, this would make the entire protocol unmanageable for a large number of users.
It is possible to change the rule, but now we have no clear cut way to do it: should resolution be given priority over abortion? Should one of them be chosen non-deterministically? Should the TTP deadlock? Each choice leads to a different AL SP specification, which can be motivated on different grounds.
Monotone and nonmonotone protocols
At this stage, one may wonder whether this problem -the difference between trace and parallel models -is just present in fair-exchange protocols, as no other protocol seems to have suffered from this problem before.
We argue that the problem is more general, and indeed that it is in the definition of protocol from Definition 2.1. A similar definition can be derived from the strand-space model by Guttman et al. [28] , from Paulson's models [19] and from the current CSP [22, 14] and CCS [12] modelling of protocols.
The key issue is that one usually imposes constraints on what is in a trace, but has no constraint on what is not in a trace. This didn't seem to be a problem as all protocols in Clark and Jacob library [11] , i.e. practically all authentication and key exchange protocols, can be framed within this definition, and industrial protocols such as SET [15] or TLS follow the rule [4, 20] .
Fair-exchange protocols, and all auction protocols, contravene this rule: a protocol is resolved only if there is not already an abort message in the trace, a bid is winning if there is not already another winner in the trace, etc.
This makes it possible to define two major classes of protocols: monotone In a monotone protocol the answer is yes: the protocol is monotone because adding (interleaving) a valid trace with another (different) valid trace is still a valid trace. With a nonmonotone protocol, we can no longer do so. For instance, in role-based protocol models, like those used by Lowe [14] , Song [25] , and Stoller [26] , a bounded degree of (unsynchronized) parallellism can be modeled by a protocol transformation, which statically takes, for instance, two copies of a role of the original protocol, and interleaves the copies in various ways. However, this only works for monotone protocols.
In Figure 5 we show a simple auction protocol where interleaving cannot be done. A and B bid for a good and M simply certifies who arrived first. Any of the participants might want to refresh the "winning" certificates, so the protocol does not necessarily terminate with the first announcement.
It is easy to see that if we take the trace where alice sends the first bid, followed by bob, and then by another bid from alice, and just rename nonces and change alice with bob, there is no way in which the two traces can be interleaved. In any trace there can only be one message of the form {A||N A } sK M . Thus, in a trace-based model it is not possible to attack this protocol. However, as soon as we allow for parallel messages to arrive, the way in which we implement the check "A arrived first" makes a difference as M may be led into an inconsistent state.
This classification is not just important for formal verification purposes but also for practical implementations. Monotone protocols can have parallel implementations -just fork a new thread for each TCP/IP request and forget all the rest -, for nonmonotone ones things are not so simple. For instance, for the optimistic fair exchange protocol, if we assume a local implementation (e.g. one single Trusted Third Party for the whole Internet) even a local synchronization on individual variables (resolve/abort) would not be sufficient. We would need to have a synchronization step at the begining and ending of each protocol step. If we go for more realistic distributed implementations, more sophisticated low level protocols and synchronization primitives such as write-once registers are needed.
It is an intriguing goal to determine which formalisms can cope with nonmonotone protocols in their full generality. For instance, we conjecture that strand-spaces, where protocols are defined by roles, e.g. as done by Song [25] or Stoller [26] , can only cope with monotone protocols. Moreover, it remains to be seen which are adequate AL SP rules for dealing with nonmonotone protocols. We leave these issues open for future investigations.
